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I. INTRODUCTION
“In this world nothing can be said to be certain,
except death and taxes.”1
–Benjamin Franklin
“Let the amelioration in our laws of property proceed from the con-
cession of the rich, not from the grasping of the poor. . . . Let us un-
derstand that the equitable rule is, that no one should take
more than his share, let him be ever so rich.”2
–Ralph Waldo Emerson
An older couple has a one-third stake in a time-share, owned as
tenants in common, which they purchased many years ago with two
other couples.  Over the years the owners of the two other shares have
changed.  With this change of ownership, so too has the vision for the
† Author Bio: J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky College of Law, Spring
2014; B.S. in Accounting and Finance 2011, University of Kentucky.
The Author would like to thank Professor Stephen Clowney, Professor Kathryn
Moore, and Professor Jennifer Bird-Pollan for their assistance and guidance with this
Comment.
1. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), http://
www.notable-quotes.com/f/franklin_benjamin.html.
2. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS AND LECTURES 149 (2009).
149
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\1-2\TWR205.txt unknown Seq: 2 21-NOV-13 7:40
150 TEXAS A&M J. OF REAL PROPERTY LAW [Vol. 1
property changed.  The dated property no longer suits the new own-
ers, causing the new co-tenants to make substantial improvements to
the time-share.  The improvements have increased the value of the
property by a large amount. These improvements have also, unbe-
knownst to the elderly couple, increased the property taxes owed by
each of the owners. The older couple is now being asked to contribute
a greater amount of taxes than they expected. With a limited budget,
the couple can no longer afford to pay the property taxes and are
forced to part with their share in the property due to the improve-
ments made by the other co-tenants.
The above hypothetical poses an upsetting, yet serious, problem in
property law.  There is an inconsistency caused by two competing
common laws that has left a gap in the law of property in regards to
concurrent estates.  A co-tenant is liable for costs paid by the other
co-tenant that are necessary to maintain the property, specifically
property taxes.3  However, a co-tenant is not liable for the cost of an
improvement made by another co-tenant.4  But what would be the re-
sult if the improvement caused an increase in the tax liability?  Would
the improving co-tenant be able to recover the tax consistent with the
rule for necessary costs?  Or would the non-improving party be pro-
tected by the rule that a co-tenant is not liable for the costs of the
improvements?
This Comment argues that a co-tenant who improves a concurrent
estate without the consent of the other co-tenant should be liable for
the increased tax liability caused by the improvement.  Part II surveys
the current law surrounding concurrent estates, providing background
to the common law rules on the various types of co-tenants.  This will
provide context for the subsequent argument about how property
taxes could have a drastic effect on the current face of concurrent es-
tates.  The Author will overview property taxes as they relate to local
property, delving into the property tax rates, in particular, and how
they relate to concurrent estates.
In Part III, the Author will discuss the principles of a sound state
tax policy, and weigh those principles to determine what are the most
important factors in creating a tax.  This will illuminate the need for a
concrete rule and what that rule should be.
Part IV of this Comment will set up the central problem: whether a
co-tenant can improve the concurrent estate to the extent that the
property tax liability is too great for the other co-tenant, essentially
improving the co-tenant out of the property.  The problem poses re-
lated issues with the well-established case law.  If the purpose of not
allowing a co-tenant the right to contribution for improvements is to
3. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 358 (Vicki Bean et al. eds., 7th ed.
2010).
4. Id.
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prevent a wealthier co-tenant from ousting his or her other co-tenants,
then why can he or she currently do it through a loophole of creating
tax liability?  However, if the non-improving co-tenant is not liable for
the property tax, is the purpose behind the required contribution for
necessary costs void?
Part V will offer a solution to the tax liability from improvements to
concurrent property.  The Author will propose to close the gap in the
law consistent with the rule for improvements by a co-tenant.  The
improving co-tenant will be liable for the rise in tax liability for any
improvement done without the consent of the non-improver.  Ulti-
mately, a co-tenant should not be in danger of being ousted from a
concurrent estate by an increase in tax liability due to non-consented
improvements to the property owned in joint tenancy.  Therefore, the
Author proposes the gap in the current law be addressed with the req-
uisite legislation.
II. THE LANDSCAPE OF PROPERTY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
The inevitability and the necessity of taxes for the operation of our
government and society are clearly evident by the current landscape
of our tax system.  Taxation is the backbone of the federal and local
governments’ attempt to raise revenue.5 For local governments in par-
ticular, property taxes are one of the most—if not the most important
taxes levied—so much so that it has shaped the rules of concurrent
estates.6  Concurrent estates have taken most of their shape under the
heavy influence of common law. Similarly, the rules of contribution
for concurrent estates have also been formed largely by the common
law.7  Property taxes, on the other hand, are creatures of state legisla-
tures and are created for the purpose of producing revenue.8  As often
occurs when common law and statutes overlap in an area of the law,
some issues slip through the cracks unaddressed by either.9  In the
overlap of these two areas of law, a void has been created.  Non-im-
proving co-tenants are forced to pay the property taxes for improve-
ments they did not consent to because of mandatory property taxes
combined with the common law rules of contribution for concurrent
5. See WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 802 (West ed., 9th ed. 2005); Roberton Williams, The Numbers: What are
the federal government’s sources of revenue?, TAX POLICY CENTER (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/numbers/revenue.cfm.
6. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 802; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note
3, at 358.
7. Id. at 319.
8. See FERDINAND P. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: THE LAW AND
POLICY OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TAXATION 56 (2003).
9. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007, 1051 (1989) (explaining that common law can be used when there is
a gap left by statutory schemes).
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estates.  This Section will further provide a brief background of the
property laws on concurrent estates in the United States.
A. Common Law Concurrent Estates
Concurrent ownership is when two or more people are in posses-
sion of the same property.10  Concurrent estates can be broken down
into three separate types: tenancy in common, joint tenancy, and ten-
ancy by the entirety.11  The three types have only slight differences,
one of them being that tenancy in common does not require that the
four unities—time, title, interest, and possession—be met.12
Tenancy in common is the default type of concurrent estate if there
is no specification when the transfer of property is made.13  Tenancy in
common is also the most frequently formed type of concurrent es-
tate.14  As tenants in common, each tenant owns an undivided share of
the whole property with most of the rights an independent landowner
would have, including the right to sell their share of the property.15  A
tenancy in common does not have a right of survivorship, which is the
main difference between it and the second type of concurrent estate—
joint tenancy.16  In joint tenancy, the tenants are no longer seen as
separate owners of the property in the sense that when one tenant
dies his or her share in the property goes to the other tenant.17  The
third type of concurrent estate is tenancy by the entirety and can only
be created by husband and wife.18  It is very similar to joint tenancy in
that there is a right of survivorship.  This type of concurrent estate,
unlike the other two, cannot be unilaterally destroyed by one of the
spouses without the other spouse’s consent.19
As the most prevalent concurrent estate, tenancy in common will be
the focus for purposes of this Comment.  The rights of survivorship in
joint tenancy and in tenancy by the entirety slightly affect the theory
behind who should bear the burden of the tax of an improvement.
Since the property is transferred in whole to the surviving tenant, the
10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (9th ed. 2009).
11. Id.
12. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 320.
13. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 54 (2d ed. 1984).
14. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002).
15. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 319–20.
16. Id. The right to survivorship does not exist in tenancy in common. Instead,
when a property owner dies, his share of the property is passed on to his heirs.
17. BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 13, at 54.
18. DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 321.
19. Id. at 320. Unlike tenancy in common and joint tenancy, both parties are
needed to destroy tenancy by the entirety. In either joint tenancy or tenancy in com-
mon, one of the property owners may petition for partition of the concurrent estate.
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value of the property will be realized by the non-improving party as-
suming the non-improver outlives the improver.20
With the right of survivorship, there could be a stronger argument
for taxing each party equally due to the non-improver having a future
interest in the improver’s portion of ownership.  However, a tenancy
in common, without the right of survivorship, could leave the non-
improver and his or her heirs owning the property, paying the taxes,
and never receiving the benefit of the value of the improvement,
which could both potentially grow substantially over time.
B. Rules for Contribution
The general rule for improvements made by a concurrent tenant
without the consent of other co-tenants is that there is no contribution
for the cost of the improvement.21  The improver is not without re-
course though.  The tenant that improves the property can get the
value of the improvement added to the property at partition of the
property.22  Many jurisdictions, including Kentucky, have adopted the
common law rule that there is no right to contribution for improve-
ments that are not necessary and made without the consent of the
other co-tenant.23  One of the driving forces behind this rule is to pro-
tect the rights of the other co-tenant.  There is a fear that co-tenant A
will “improve” co-tenant B out of the property.  This well-established
rule, however, prevents a co-tenant from improving the property by a
substantial amount and then forcing the other co-tenants to reimburse
him or her for the improvement, or ousting the co-tenant for
nonpayment.24
On the other hand, the general rule of property in regards to prop-
erty tax is that each co-tenant is liable for their share of tax liability
equal to their share of the property.25 If one tenant pays more than his
or her share of the taxes, then he or she has a right to contribution
from the other tenants.26  “The payment of taxes is generally involun-
20. See id. at 320. The improvement to the property could be recognized by the
non-improving party upon the death of the improving party. The right to the land
passes to the other owner in the case of joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety.
21. Id. at 358.
22. Id. In a judicial partition the improver of the property receives the value ad-
ded to the property, not just the amount spent on the improvement.
23. E.g., Mastin v. Mastin’s Adm’r, 50 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1932); Bras v. Bras, 463 F.2d
413 (10th Cir. 1972); Kline v. Wright, 51 F.2d 564 (D. Idaho 1931); Higgins v. Eva, 267
P. 1081 (Cal. 1928); Middlebury Elec. Co. v. Tupper, 41 A. 582 (Vt. 1898); Stevens v.
Thompson, 17 N.H. 103 (1845).
24. Helmken v. Meyer, 75 S.E. 586 (Ga. 1912).
25. See Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Co-
Tenant Possession Value Liability and A Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 331, 355.
26. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 357; see Aiello v. Aiello, 302 A.2d 189
(Md. 1973); Conley v. Sharpe, 136 P.2d 376 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Cochran v.
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tary.”27  Since taxes are a mandatory payment and not voluntary like
that of an improvement, there is a right of action for the payor of the
tax against his or her co-tenant for taxes paid on his or her behalf.28
The theory behind allowing for contribution for taxes “is that the pro-
tection of the interest of each cotenant from extinction by a tax or
foreclosure sale imposes on each the duty to contribute to the extent
of his proportionate share [of] the money required to make such pay-
ments.”29  This begs the question of whether a non-improving party is
liable for an increase in taxes due to an improvement that he or she
did not consent to.
C. Property Tax
Ad valorem taxes, commonly referred to as “property taxes,” have
been a long-standing staple of local governments in their attempt to
create revenue.30 Property taxes “provide about one-quarter of local
revenue.”31  Although the rates have decreased significantly over the
years, the property tax still constitutes a large portion of states’ reve-
nues.32  The Kentucky Constitution gives Kentucky the power to tax
property.33  Furthermore, Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) section
32.020 states that there shall be an ad valorem tax paid annually, spe-
cifically on real property.34  The statutory provisions go on to define
“real property” as “all lands within this state and improvements
thereon.”35
KRS section 132.690 requires each real property parcel be assessed
annually and be physically inspected no less than once every four
years, but can be assessed each year.36  The local government assesses
the fair value of the property and then calculates the tax the property
owner must pay on the property.37  This is done through a property
valuation administrator (“PVA”) who assesses the property value,
usually without any action required from the property owner.38  De-
pending on the particular circumstances, some of which are under a
Godard, 78 P.2d 692 (Okla. 1938); Kirsch v. Scandia American Bank, 199 N.W. 881
(Minn. 1924); Eads v. Retherford, 16 N.E. 587 (Ind. 1888).
27. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 78 S.W. 465, 466 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904).
28. Id.
29. 2 JAMES A. CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.17, at 73–74 (1952).
30. BLACK’S, supra note 10, at 1594; BROWN ET AL., KENTUCKY TAX LAW 7 (UK
CLE 2d ed. 1995).
31. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 802.
32. See id. (stating that roughly one-third to one-fourth of local revenues are pro-
vided by property taxes).
33. KY. CONST. § 171; Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Ky. 1988).
34. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.020 (West 2012).
35. § 132.010.
36. § 132.690.
37. See PVA FAYETTE COUNTY, KY, http://www.fayette-pva.com (last visited Mar.
17, 2013).
38. BROWN ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.
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property owner’s control, the property value can increase and subse-
quently the tax liability will increase as well.  Improvements to the
property, which are under the property owner’s control, can raise the
property value.39  There are also uncontrollable events—government
need, the increased value of the neighborhood, or funding of sur-
rounding schools—that can increase the value of property.40
“[T]he taxation of real property generates the largest amount of
property tax revenue within Kentucky; yet it requires the least amount
of taxpayer involvement. As a result, Kentucky tax officials pursue
real property taxes with significantly more vigor than [other] property
taxes.”41  However, for Kentucky to be able to tax the property, the
property must have a taxable situs in Kentucky.42 Situs is the jurisdic-
tion that the assets are connected to for taxation purposes.43  Deter-
mining the situs of real property, withstanding property spanning
multiple jurisdictions, is relatively easy.44  Real property’s situs is the
jurisdiction in which the said property lies, whether it be a city,
county, or state.45
The tax rates levied on real property vary from locale to locale. The
variations are due to the rates being set by the state as well as the local
governments in each state.46  For purposes of this Comment, the Au-
thor will use Fayette County, Kentucky’s rates for illustration.  The
Kentucky state tax on real property alone for the year 2012 was 12.2
cents to every $100.47  Fayette County’s seven districts, on average,
taxed an additional 94.35 cents per $100.48  Together this equals about
$1.07 for every $100 of real property a person owns.  This tax rate is
39. See, e.g., Karen E. Powell, A Historical Perspective on Montana Property Tax:
25 Years of Statewide Appraisal and Appeal Practice, 70 MONT. L. REV. 21, 23 (2009).
40. Dennis Hartman, What Increases Property Taxes?, SAN FRANCISCO HOME
GUIDES (Sept. 20, 2012), http://homeguides.sfgate.com/increases-property-taxes-2487
.html.
41. BROWN ET AL., supra note 30, at 14.
42. Commonwealth v. Union P.R.R., 283 S.W. 119, 121 (Ky. 1926).
43. BLACK’S, supra note 10, at 1513.
44. BROWN ET AL., supra note 30, at 15.
45. Id.
46. See Nina L. Pickering, Local Control vs. Poor Patrol: Can Discriminatory Po-
lice Protection Be Remedied Through the Education Finance Litigation Model?, 86
B.U. L. REV. 741, 771 (2006); John A. Swain, The Taxation of Private Interests in
Public Property: Toward a Unified Theory of Property Taxation, 2000 UTAH L. REV.
421, 458.
47. Press Release, Commonwealth of Kentucky, State Property Tax Rate Remains
Set at 12.2 Cents for 2012 (July 2, 2012), http://revenue.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/
832BECB1-65A6-4ABF-A162-341B9AD25B67/0/
StatePropertyTaxRateRemainsSetat122Centsfor2012.pdf.
48. Tax Districts and Rates, PVA FAYETTE COUNTY, http://www.fayette-pva.com/
tax-districts-and-calculator (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). The average was calculated by
adding the districts together, dividing the number of districts, and then subtracting the
statewide tax from the quotient.
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relatively moderate in comparison to the rest of the United States.49
In a comparison of all fifty states done in 2009, Indianapolis, Indiana
had an alarmingly high effective real property tax rate of 2.75%, or
$2.75 for every $100 in value, and the national average was 1.4%.50
As apparent by the comparison with the rest of the country, Kentucky
has fairly bearable real property taxes.  By using Fayette County’s tax
rates, the problem of an increased tax liability due to an improvement
will be tempered, but the results will still be candid.
Local governments’ need for property taxes ensures that the taxes
will be collected regardless of if they are paid by the improver or the
non-improver.  The rule for contribution is premised on the theory
that each co-tenant should pay their share of necessary costs, such as
taxes.  However, when an improvement is done without the consent of
one of the co-tenants, the non-improving co-tenant should not be lia-
ble for the increase in the property tax.  The improving co-tenant
should be liable for the amount of increase in the property tax that
was caused by his or her improvement.  The gap in the common law
rule of contribution has yet to be resolved by judicial action or
legislation.
III. INCREASE IN PROPERTY VALUE EQUATES
TO INCREASED TAXES
As seen above in the real property tax rates for Fayette County,
Kentucky, a property owner could potentially have a significant tax
liability each year.51  The problem, and prevailing issue, is that a con-
current estate could be improved by one co-tenant, the improver, and
the other co-tenant, the non-improver, must pay a portion of the tax
liability based on the improvement.  There is potential that the im-
provement could cause a tax liability for the non-improving co-tenant
that he or she cannot afford to pay.  Essentially the improver could
oust the non-improver with a necessary cost, the property tax.  It is
established that one co-tenant cannot improve a co-tenant out of the
property, and the improving tenant has no right to contribution for
the improvements made to the property by said tenant.52  However,
the improving tenant has a right to contribution for necessary costs,
such as taxes owed on the property.53  Although the non-improver will
not be liable for the cost of the improvements made to the property,
the non-improving tenant can still be held liable for the tax liability on
49. See Who Pays America’s Highest Property Taxes, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2009),
available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/22/taxes-homes-property-forbeslife-cx_mw
_0122realestate_table_6.html.
50. Tax Rates Subject Guide, INT’L ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, http://www
.iaao.org/uploads/Tax_Rates_Subject_Guide.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
51. Tax Districts and Rates, supra note 48.
52. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 358.
53. Id.
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the property.54  Therefore, the improving tenant could increase the
value of the property to an amount that would create a tax liability for
the non-improver that he or she is not able to pay.
To illustrate the gravity of the problem, the Author will apply the
current Fayette County, Kentucky property tax rates to a hypothetical
co-tenant situation where one co-tenant improves the property owned
in tenancy in common without the consent of the other co-tenant.55
For purposes of continuity and simplicity, the improving party will be
Adams and the non-improving party will be Begley.  Adams and
Begley are tenants in common with no right to survivorship and with
equal rights to the land.  Adams builds an addition to the land that
increases the value of the property by $10,000.  Applying the real
property tax rate of Fayette County of $1.07 for every $100 would
create an additional annual tax liability of $107.  Under the property
rule of contribution for necessary costs, Adams would be entitled to
$53.50 from Begley.  Take this hypothetical a step further and apply
the 2013 tax rate for Gloversville, New York—a city with one of the
highest property tax rates in America—of $5.24 per $100.56  The im-
provement would now create an additional tax liability of $524, and
Adams would be entitled to $262.
Although this does not seem like a grave amount that would leave
Begley in a situation where she could not afford the taxes, the im-
provement value can easily be amplified, especially over time.  Adams
may not take Begley to court for the contribution of the tax, but Ad-
ams’s heirs may not have the same relationship with Begley’s heirs
and the value of the improvement in the future could increase to
$100,000.  Assuming the property tax rates in Gloversville, New York,
the improvement now creates an annual liability of $2,620 for each
tenant, presuming the tax rates do not increase.57  This annual tax lia-
bility could potentially be too extreme for Begley to afford, and Ad-
ams could essentially improve Begley out of the property through the
current gap in the laws of common law property.  To see which direc-
tion the law should go, it is essential to examine the tax policy.
54. Id. at 357.
55. Due to the nature of concurrent estates and their close relationships, there are
no facts from prior case law to apply the property tax rates.
56. Rick Karlin, Survey: Taxes Sky High in State, TIMES UNION (May 9, 2013),
available at http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Survey-Taxes-sky-high-in-state-
4500704.php.
57. This is not to be confused with ameliorative waste found in life estates. Ame-
liorative waste is not used when the property is owned concurrently. See, e.g., Marsha
Baumgarner & Michael Hentrel, What a Waste! What’s a Prudent Lender To Do?, 5
BUS. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 10, 11 (2008); Note, Liability for Ameliorative Waste, 43
HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1930).
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IV. WHAT MAKES A GOOD TAX?
Taxes are used to produce revenue for the federal and state govern-
ments, but people are not arbitrarily taxed.  There is policy behind
what is taxed and at what rate it is taxed.  In David Brunori’s book
State Tax Policy, he lays out five principles of sound tax policy: pro-
vision of appropriate revenues; neutrality; fair and equitable; easy
and economical to administer; and accountability.58  In reference to
whether the non-improving co-tenant should be taxed, two of these
principles are in the forefront: whether taxing the non-improver
would be fair and equitable and the ease to administer the tax on the
parties.  The other principles do not pose the same issues that arise
with the principles of fairness and equitability and ease and economi-
cal to administer.  But they help provide a background of why local
governments tax and why those taxes are vital to the local govern-
ments’ sustainability.  It is imperative to analyze the principles of
sound tax policy to determine whether the contribution rule for neces-
sary costs or improvements should be followed.  Examining the tax
principles will expose that the improvement rule should be applied,
and the increased tax base should be applied to the improver of the
property.
A. Fair and Equitable
The principle of fairness and equitability is probably the most diffi-
cult policy goal to meet, but presumably the most important.59  It can
be broken down into horizontal equity, treating similar taxpayers
equally, and vertical equity, taking into consideration the taxpayer’s
ability to pay.60  Brunori goes on to explain that a lack of horizontal
equity would cause similarly situated taxpayers to pay different taxes
and can cause taxpayers to distrust the government.  However, actu-
ally creating horizontal equity can be all but nearly impossible with
tax cuts based on the class of a citizen.61  Vertical equity, on the other
hand, deals with the ability to pay the tax. The biggest concern is to
not have a regressive tax—a tax burden that increases as the tax base
decreases.62  Property taxes are usually progressive taxes—taxes that
increase as the tax base increases—so vertical equity is usually not an
issue with real property taxes due to the nature of the flat tax.63  As
the value of the property increases, so too does the tax liability.  Taxes
58. DAVID BRUNORI, STATE TAX POLICY: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 13–27
(2001).
59. Id. at 19.
60. Id.; STATE TAXATION POLICY 27 (Michael Barker ed., 1983).
61. BRUNORI, supra note 58, at 19–20 (explaining that the tax status of a person
can potentially provide more tax breaks than other citizens; for example, a married
couple will receive more favorable tax treatment than a single person in an identical
situation, sans the marriage).
62. Id. at 21.
63. Id.
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are designed largely with the principles behind vertical and horizontal
equity.
Applying horizontal equity to the issue of who should pay the taxes
on improved real property simply undercuts the long-standing prop-
erty rule of contribution for taxes by a co-tenant when combined with
the property rule for improvements.  It is true that the non-improving
co-tenant is not liable for the cost of the improvements, but the im-
prover gets the improvements at a sale or partition.64  This puts the
improving co-tenant in a different position than the non-improving co-
tenant because now the improver has a potential gain on the property
that the non-improver will not have any right to.  Yet, the property
rule, in regards to the property tax, would subject the non-improver to
pay for his or her share of the improvements even though the non-
improver will not receive any benefit from the improvement.
The principle of horizontal equity, to treat taxpayers that are simi-
larly situated the same, is void if the non-improver is forced to pay a
tax on the improvement.65  The improver is in a higher position than
the non-improver in regards to the concurrent estate, in that the im-
prover is the sole recipient of the increased value of the property at a
sale or partition.  The question seems to be who owns the value of the
improvement.  In the view of fairness and equity, the improver should
bear the full burden of the tax liability created by the improvement
because the improver received the value of the improvement.  If the
non-improver is to pay taxes, then the non-improver should receive an
equal portion of the value at a sale or partition, an event that would
be in total opposition to the property rule of contributions.  The clear
contradiction of the common law contribution rules creates a conflict
in the policy behind state taxes and the property rules for concurrent
estates.
B. Easy and Economical Administration
The other principle of a sound tax policy at issue here is the ease of
administering the tax on the property.  The need for an easy and eco-
nomical administration of taxes can be summed up in two words:
more money.66  Easier and cheaper tax administration results in less
money spent on collecting those taxes, which produces more reve-
nue.67  Taxes that require little to no deductions, exclusions, or credits
will create less complexity.  In turn, this will lower potential ligation
costs and auditing costs on the government’s behalf.68  Real property
taxes have been seen as very economical taxes in regard to other taxes
64. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 358.
65. See STATE TAXATION POLICY, supra note 60, at 27.
66. BRUNORI, supra note 58, at 22–23.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id at 22–23.
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levied by the government.69  Property taxes, in general, are not com-
plex for either the taxpayer or the government. For the taxpayer, little
work is involved.  A PVA assesses the value of the property and then
the taxpayer is simply billed and pays taxes on the assessed value.70
On the side of the government, property taxes are hard to escape by
taxpayers.  The base of the tax—the real property—cannot be
moved.71 Generally, property taxes are an easy and economical tax to
administer by state governments.72
The current stability and relative simplicity of the property tax
seems to favor the opposite outcome of the fairness debate.73  To keep
the property tax simple, and therefore profitable, the improver and
non-improver should pay the same tax.  In reality, it would seem that
the government would not delve too deeply into the matter as long as
the tax is paid.  The tax is on the property itself, not on the property
owners.74  If the tax is not paid then a lien can be put on the property
by the government, providing the government with the land as a se-
curity until the debts are paid.75  Since the tax is on the property itself,
it would not make sense for the government to make a special rule for
joint tenants so that the tax could be apportioned in proportion to the
speculative value the owners would receive at partition or sale.  When
taking into consideration the goal of the property tax, an apportion-
ment of the taxes would be time consuming and a burden on the gov-
ernment, defeating the purpose of an easy and economic
administration of the tax.
C. The Other Principles
The “other principles,” as the Author has coined them, are not in-
ferior to the two principles which are discussed at length.  These three
principles—provision of appropriate revenues, neutrality, and ac-
countability—do not pose the same controversies, but do help provide
a justification for the property tax and why the increase of the prop-
erty tax by an improvement should be borne by the improver.
Before the positives and negatives of a tax may be debated, first, a
tax is needed which is where the principle of provision of appropriate
revenues appears.  State governments must raise the appropriate
amount of revenue to meet their yearly expenditures, and to do this,
local governments use a taxing system.76  Appropriate revenues not
only include the current year’s expenses but also the future years’ ex-
69. Id. at 27.
70. BROWN ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.
71. BRUNORI, supra note 58, at 27.
72. Id.
73. See supra Part IV–A.
74. See supra Part IV–A.
75. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.420 (West 2012).
76. BRUNORI, supra note 58, at 15.
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penses.77  Stability in revenue is necessary and can be achieved by va-
rying the types of taxes—making sure that some are less affected by
economic events.  In line with stability, any significant changes in the
taxing system should be calculated due to these changes causing in-
creased administration costs.78
The need for local taxes is crucial to a state government.  Without
the appropriation of taxes, state governments would become deficient
on public expenditures creating an unbalanced budget and a govern-
ment riddled with debt.  As stated above, Kentucky, like many other
states, relies heavily on the taxing of property to raise sufficient funds.
The importance of the property tax cannot be undersold, which only
heightens the problem of the increase of taxes due to improving a
concurrent estate.  This essential revenue for the local governments
will equate to the determination in which they will seek the tax.  Hav-
ing the current uncertainty of who is liable for the increased tax liabil-
ity is paramount.
The next principle, neutrality, is based on the theory that taxes
should not affect market decisions.  Realistically this is not the case,
but an effective tax will reduce the distortions.79  Tax neutrality,
though not often accomplished, is diminished due to the tax breaks
and deductions given to corporations and individuals, creating incen-
tives to make certain decisions.  Decreases in property taxes are usu-
ally included in the tax breaks given.80
Although neutrality is rarely accomplished and property taxes are
one of the main taxes affected by the tax breaks, the theory remains
the same—market decisions should be affected as little as possible by
taxes.  However, a non-improver could be forced to sell his or her
share of the property, a market decision, due to the increase in taxes
caused by a non-consented to improvement because of the rule of
contribution.  The increase in the non-improver’s tax liability would
be in direct conflict with the principle of neutrality.  By taxing the
improver for the increase in the tax liability, the spirit of the principle
of neutrality is satisfied.
The last of the principles, accountability, involves a variety of differ-
ent roles for the state to play.  The state government must enforce the
laws, make sure the administration is performing its duties correctly,
provide an open and transparent taxing system and, most importantly
to this issue, analyze the current law to make sure it is effective and
efficient.81  Few states actually perform the last role, evaluating the
existing law, “[d]espite the importance of preserving the integrity of
77. Id.
78. Id. at 16.
79. Id. at 17–18.
80. Id. at 18.
81. Id. at 24–26.
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tax systems.”82  Since states are not required by law to evaluate their
laws, many states fail to routinely evaluate the tax system.  This has
caused many states to overlook taxes that may be burdensome or
inefficient.83
There is no current law regarding the specific issue of who bears the
liability of an increase in property tax when one co-tenant makes an
improvement to a concurrent estate without the other co-tenant’s con-
sent.  This could be due to state governments’ lack of evaluating their
current laws or to other reasons that are inherent in relationships of
concurrent estate owners.84  Regardless of the reason, the state gov-
ernment should evaluate the current tax system, which lacks the requi-
site legislation to enforce that co-tenants cannot be forced out of their
concurrent estate due to an increase in taxes caused by an improve-
ment.  The absence of this type of legislation creates inefficiency in the
courts and fails the accountability principle.
D. How They Fit Together
Looking at the two previously discussed principles, fairness and rea-
sonableness along with easy and economical administration, reveals a
polarity in the tax policy argument.  To be fair and reasonable, the
non-improver should not have to pay any additional tax accrued due
to the improvement.  On the other hand, to keep the property tax easy
to administer and, therefore, profitable, the government should not
have to alter the way in which property taxes are collected to appor-
tion for a niche in the law.  In the context of tax policy alone, disre-
garding long-standing property rules and Kentucky’s ad valorem
statutes, the principles create a conundrum, making it necessary to
analyze and weigh the principles while seemingly giving more impor-
tance to one over the other.
What comprises a good tax policy varies because each person will
put a different emphasis on what matters the most.85  Taxes are
viewed in a variety of different aspects, from the burden they place on
the taxpayer to the revenue they creates for the government.86  That
being said, strictly as a policy matter, the fairness and reasonableness
of a tax outweighs the importance of its being easy to administer.  The
taxing of the non-improver for an improvement made without his or
her consent would set a terrible precedent.  The non-improver would
essentially have a tax liability when he or she would have no tax base
for the value.  The improver, receiving all of the value of the improve-
ment, yet only being liable for a portion of the tax, would have no
82. Id. at 26.
83. Id. at 26–27.
84. See infra p. 15. The close relationships that tenants in common have may inci-
dentally cause local and state governments to see this as a non-pressing issue.
85. BRUNORI, supra note 58, at 13.
86. See STATE TAXATION POLICY, supra note 60, at 27.
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incentive to get the consent of the other tenant.  The strongest argu-
ment for taxing the non-improver is that property taxes have histori-
cally been an easy tax to administer, and changing this would be a
burden on the government.  In reality, local and state governments
would not have to change their current practices.  The route that must
be taken to recover the taxes is through the judicial system as is evi-
dent by the case law regarding contributions of taxes.87  With that be-
ing said, it is apparent that, in considering who should bear the
liability of the tax, the fair and reasonable argument reigns supreme.
When viewed along with the other principles of a sound state tax
policy, it is clear what direction the law should proceed.  Only one
principle marginally favors having an equal contribution of the in-
crease in property taxes when an improver improves the property
without consent.  The four other principles clearly support the im-
prover bearing any increase in the property tax owed due to an im-
provement of the property.  This avenue is most in line with sound tax
policy, while still embodying the spirit of the common law property
rules of contribution.
V. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE
Currently, there is not statutory law that speaks to the problem in
any state, nor is there any case law or model legislation on point.
There exists a deficiency in the current law that needs to be filled.
Concurrent estates are an intriguing creature, subject to archaic com-
mon law rules that have been around for over a hundred years.88
There is a tendency for co-tenants to work things out amongst them-
selves.  Tenancy in common is a long-term, repeat player relationship
with high incentives to get along.89  This is evident by the lack of cases
that have passed through the Kentucky judicial system in recent years.
One case concerning tenancy in common has been brought before the
Kentucky courts in the past ten years and only three cases in the past
twenty-five years.90  The only avenue for co-tenants in a dispute is a
judicial proceeding to receive contribution, a partition, or sale of the
property.91
87. See, e.g., Rose v. Holbrook, 287 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1956); Larmon v. Larmon,
191 S.W. 110 (Ky. 1917).
88. See, e.g., Rose, 287 S.W.2d at 914; Mastin v. Mastin’s Adm’r, 50 S.W.2d 77 (Ky.
1932); Larmon, 191 S.W. at 110; Conley v. Sharpe, 136 P.2d 376 (1943); Eads v.
Retherford, 16 N.E. 587 (1888).
89. See ROBERT C. ELLIKCKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND
THE HEARTH 45 (2008) (explaining that landlords and tenants have a high incentive to
get along because they frequently interact with each other).
90. Sanderson v. Saxon, 834 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1992); Johnson v. Envtl. & Pub. Prot.
Cabinet, 289 S.W.3d 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009); Martin v. Martin, 878 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1994).
91. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 338.
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Partition is achieved in one of two ways, a partition in kind, which is
favored, or a partition by sale.92  In a partition in kind, each co-tenant
will receive a separate parcel of the property.  If this cannot be done
equally, then one party may have to pay the other for the difference.93
The other type of partition is a partition by sale, which is ordered in
two situations: “(1) the physical attributes of the land are such that a
partition in kind is impracticable or inequitable; and (2) the interests
of the owners would better be promoted by a partition by sale.”94
Since most tenancy in common relationships are based on long-term
amiability, there is a need for precedent on who is to pay the in-
creased tax liability resulting from an improvement to the property.
The solutions available at this time—judicial proceeding, sale of the
land, or a partition—can be expensive and potentially lead to a court
compelling the co-tenants to sell their property.95
It seems that it would be necessary to speculate as to what the law
should be according to the current statutes and case law that stands in
the areas of property and property taxes.  The property laws and tax
policy surrounding the tax influx, due to an improvement, weigh in
both directions—taxing the co-tenants equally and taxing the co-te-
nants in proportion to the tax base each has in the land.  These must
first be weighed against each other before proposing a solution to the
problem.
Taxing each of the co-tenants equally would be consistent with the
long history of case law regarding the contribution of taxes. Courts
have been consistent with this rule since the 1800s.96  Since taxes must
be paid on the property and are a necessary cost, the law states that a
tenant has the right to contribution.97  Keeping with that reasoning,
the tax on the improvement should not be special, should be treated
as any other necessary cost, and should be recoverable by a co-tenant
if he or she is to pay the tax to maintain the property.  Since the tax is
not a voluntary payment, co-tenants should not be responsible for
paying more than their share.98  Moreover, looking at the policy be-
hind state and local taxes, taxing each of the co-tenants equally lends
itself to the easy and economical administration of the tax.  The tax
base for real property taxes is property itself.99  Applying a special
form of taxation for joint tenants would not coincide with the ratio-
nale of an easy application of a tax.  Reformatting the procedure
92. Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 30 (1980).
93. Id. at 30 n.7.
94. Id. at 30.
95. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 338.
96. E.g., Moroney v. Copeland, 5 Whart. 407  (Pa. 1840).
97. See, e.g., Rose v. Holbrook, 287 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1956); Larmon v. Larmon,
191 S.W. 110 (Ky. 1917).
98. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 78 S.W. 465, 466 (Ky. 1904).
99. BROWN ET AL., supra note 30, at 14.
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would be time consuming and costly, the opposite goal of the
principle.
Lastly, the main feature of concurrent ownership is that each tenant
owns an undivided share of the whole property and has most of the
same rights as an individual property owner.100  This means that each
co-tenant has the same and equal rights to the property as the other
co-tenant.  If each of the co-tenants has equal rights to the property,
then each co-tenant should be liable for an equal amount of the taxes,
even if they are attributable to an increase in value due to an uncon-
sented improvement.  Dividing the tax equally among the co-tenants
would be consistent with the seasoned common law property rule as
well as cohere to the tax policy principle of easy and economical
administration.
However, not allowing the improving co-tenant contribution for an
increase in the tax liability for improvements made without the con-
sent of the non-improver would be consistent with the common law
surrounding improvements to property that dates just as far back as
the law surrounding tax contribution.101  To combat a tenant from im-
proving other co-tenants out of the property, the courts have taken
the stand that a co-tenant in a concurrent estate cannot improve the
other co-tenants out of the property.102  Applying the rule regarding
improvements, instead of necessary costs, seems to capture the spirit
of the law in that one co-tenant cannot improve the property to the
extent that the other co-tenant can no longer afford the contributions.
“It is a general rule that the act of one joint tenant without express or
implied authority from or the consent of his cotenant cannot bind or
prejudicially affect the rights of the latter.”103  In applying this rule,
not requiring a contribution for the tax increase is foolish.  Without
consent from the non-improver, the improvement to the property
could prejudice the rights of the non-improver with the condition that
he or she could not pay the higher tax liability.
Though not directly on the issue of tax increase caused by improve-
ments by one co-tenant, there is established common law on tax in-
creases caused by improvements in landlord and tenant
relationships.104  If a tax is increased due to an improvement by the
lessee for the sole enjoyment of the lessee, then the lessee is liable for
the incremental value.105  The law on lessees-lessors correlates with
the common law of contribution of improvements.  The incremental
tax on a property held in tenancy in common should therefore be the
liability of the improver to mimic similar common law.
100. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 320.
101. Stevens v. Thompson, 17 N.H. 103 (1845).
102. See, e.g., Larmon v. Larmon,191 S.W. 110 (Ky. 1917).
103. Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P.2d 73, 76–77 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
104. E.g., Ky. Farm & Cattle Co. v. Williams, 140 F. Supp. 449, 452 (E.D. Ky. 1956).
105. 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 366.
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Furthermore, the fair and equitable principle of tax policy favors
not requiring a contribution. State and local governments try to create
taxes that appear fair.106  To achieve this goal, governments are mind-
ful of horizontal equity—treating taxpayers that are in similar situa-
tions the same.107  With the value of the improvement to the property
going to the improver at a sale or partition, it would be inequitable to
tax the non-improver on the increase in liability.108  Additionally, the
non-improver has expectations of the amount of property tax he or
she will be liable for each year.  Subjecting the non-improver to more
tax liability than he or she expected is not only unfair, but could cause
the non-improver to under-budget his or her expenses and not have
sufficient funds to pay the increased tax.  Apportioning the tax to the
co-tenants in proportion with their tax base is not only the most fair
and equitable method, but also parallels the common law rule for con-
tributions to improvements.
Considering there is no case law or statutory law on the issue, my
proposition is that, following the spirit behind the rule for contribu-
tions of improvements, the improving tenant be wholly responsible for
the additional taxes incurred due to the improvement.  This seems to
correlate with the existing law on improving concurrent estates, land-
lord tenancy law, and sound tax policy.  It strays away from the rule of
necessary costs, but if the law went in any other direction, it would
diminish the improvement law’s purpose.  Others have expressed the
view that the improving party should pay the entire tax increase.109
It goes without saying that property taxes are important to local
governments.110  With the proposed rule, the portion of the tax that is
to be paid is not set by the wayside, but instead is rightfully allocated
to the party that should be liable for the tax increment, the improving
co-tenant.  The application of the proposition would not cause undue
strife.  Considering the rules on contribution between co-tenants are
essentially only common law, adherence by the courts would be all
that is necessary.  However, the Author believes legislation would be
the preferred avenue due to the relationships that are usually seen in
106. BRUNORI, supra note 58, at 19.
107. Id.
108. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 358.
109. E.g., Tenants in Common (TICs)/Fractional Ownership Q&A, MONTEREY
COUNTY ASS’N OF REALTORS (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.mcar.com/gapdf/TIC-
QandAFinal.pdf; Tenancy in Common (TIC) Frequently Asked Questions, SIRKIN &
ASSOCIATES (May 19, 2011), http://www.andysirkin.com/htmlarticle.cfm?article=1;
Kevin Hagen, Tenancies in Common as a Way to Invest in Real Estate, YAHOO
VOICES (Dec. 28, 2007), http://voices.yahoo.com/tenancies-common-as-way-invest-
real-estate-750843.html?cat=54; Taxes and TIC, S.F. REAL EST. BRAIN, http://www.
sanfranciscorealestatebrain.com/tenancy-in-common-tic/taxes-and-tic (last visited
Mar. 17, 2013). There is no legislation in any state that speaks to the issue of who
should bear the burden of the increased tax liability. However, many different sources
share the same view, that the improving party should bear the increased liability.
110. BROWN ET AL., supra note 30, at 14.
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concurrent estates.  Legislation paralleling these ideas will: avert any
judicial proceedings that may end in partition, keeping the costs of
litigation down, and giving notice to co-tenants.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current law, as it stands, leaves a loophole open for a co-tenant
to, in essence, oust the other co-tenant through a rise in tax liability
for the unconsented improvements made to a concurrent estate.  The
Author proposes that the loophole be closed with adherence by courts
to be consistent with the current case law in neighboring areas.  Re-
quiring the contribution of increased taxes, due to an improvement by
one co-tenant without the consent of the other co-tenant, is unjust.
By complying with the common law rules now in place for tenancy in
common for taxes, there is a potential to harm the non-improving co-
tenant without recourse.  If the law goes unaltered, non-improving co-
tenants will be liable for taxes in which they have no tax base, and
could create a situation where the non-improver is not in a position to
pay necessary costs for the property.  Implementing this change in the
law is not only consistent with sound state tax law policy, but would
also be consistent with the common law of property.  The Author’s
proposition, of charging the tax increment caused by an unconsented
improvement to the improver, captures the essence of the common
law on improvements while still taking into consideration the impor-
tance of property taxes to states’ governments.
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